News & News In Spanish
Chairman Inouye, Vice-Chairman Stevens, Chairman Lautenberg, and distinguished members of the Committee, on behalf of the Secretary of Transportation, I want to thank you for the invitation to appear today.
I would like to take a moment at the outset to commend the Committee for your leadership and support in passing the Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Enforcement and Safety Act of 2006, Public Law 109-468, which the President signed into law last month. The PIPES Act will save lives and foster economic growth by strengthening the pipeline safety program.
The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) is moving ahead to implement the new authority and fulfill the Act’s mandates. We will keep the Committee informed of our efforts and progress.
I appear before you today on another important subject: PHMSA’s activities and role in enhancing hazardous materials transportation security.
We understand the Committee is considering options to improve commercial surface transportation security, and we look forward to working with the Committee. Working in close coordination with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and with the Department of Transportation’s (DOT’s) Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) and the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), we are moving forward in that effort on several fronts.
When it comes to improving transportation security, we follow a systems risk-based approach, recognizing that safety and security are connected, and that significant safety and economic consequences will flow from our decisions. The success of our efforts over time lies in our ability to mitigate overall risk, while avoiding undue burdens on transportation systems, operators, and the public. Effective coordination within the federal government is essential to addressing security concerns in the way that the American public deserves.
Improvement should be developed in a transparent manner, with the benefit of stakeholder input, to produce practical approaches suited to the demands of an economy that depends on the efficient movement of hazardous materials. We must focus and prioritize our efforts, preventing incidents that pose the greatest overall risk to the public, property, and the environment, and mitigating the consequences of incidents that cannot be prevented.
Multi-modal Hazardous Materials Program
Hazardous materials are essential to our citizens, and to our economy. These materials fuel automobiles, heat and cool our homes and offices, and are used in farming, medical applications, manufacturing, mining, and other industrial processes. More than 3 billion tons of regulated hazardous materials – including explosive, poisonous, corrosive, flammable, and radioactive materials – are transported each year.
We oversee the safe and secure shipment of over 1.2 million daily movements of hazardous materials moving through the air; on the railroads, seas and waterways; and over the highways. Many of these shipments require transfer between modes. Programs that increase the security of highway infrastructure and intermodal transfer points are required to maintain the security and safety of these movements. Additionally, large volumes of hazmat are moved by pipelines out of the view of most Americans.
These hazardous materials shipments frequently move through densely populated or sensitive areas where an incident could result in loss of life, serious injury, or significant environmental damage. Our communities, particularly the public and workers engaged in hazardous materials commerce, count on the safe and secure transport of these shipments.
Post-9/11 Hazmat Security Requirements
With Congress’ active assistance and direction, much progress has been made since 9/11 to improve the security of our transportation systems. Congress confirmed PHMSA’s role in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, when it amended Federal law to clarify the agency’s responsibility for the “safety, including security,” of hazardous materials transportation.
In 2003, we amended the Hazardous Materials Regulations to require shippers and carriers of certain hazardous materials to develop and implement security plans. The regulations established a general baseline for the development and scope of plans, rather than a prescriptive list of specific security measures. Each security plan must include an individualized risk assessment and, at a minimum, address personnel security, unauthorized access, and en route security risks. Plans must be appropriate to the company’s individual circumstances, considering the types and amounts of hazardous materials shipped or transported and the modes used for transportation. The regulation establishes a meaningful performance standard for security planning, while providing shippers and carriers with the flexibility necessary to develop security measures addressing their individual circumstances and operational environments.
DOT regulated pipeline operators are subject to different security planning standards, also requiring the development of site-specific security plans. Most pipeline operators follow a set of consensus guidelines that were jointly developed by PHMSA, pipeline operators, and State pipeline safety agencies following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The security requirements governing operators of liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities predate 9/11 and are enforced, along with our other LNG safety standards, by PHMSA and our State partners.
As the Committee is aware, PHMSA also has been actively involved in government-wide security planning and coordination efforts led by DHS. In accordance Homeland Security Presidential Directives and Executive Orders, we regularly provide technical expertise and consultation on security initiatives with DOT partners in the areas of pipeline operations and hazardous materials transportation. We contributed to the recently-completed National Infrastructure Protection Plan and participate in the Government Coordinating Councils for the Rail, Highway, Chemical and Pipeline sectors.
The PHMSA-TSA Security Annex
Most recently, PHMSA and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) have established a joint working group to improve interagency coordination on transportation security and safety matters, and to develop and advance plans for improving transportation security. As you know, PHMSA and TSA signed an Annex to the Departmental Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) executed by DOT and DHS. The Annex recognizes TSA’s lead role in transportation security and reflects the agencies’ shared commitment to a systems risk-based approach and to the development of practical solutions, recognizing that each agency brings core competencies, legal authority, resources, and expertise to this shared mission.
In entering into the Annex, PHMSA and TSA pledge to build on and not duplicate the various security initiatives and efforts already underway. At the same time, we thought it was important to outline the key program elements and approaches necessary to effective Federal action and to use that framework to identify specific areas for improvement.
Enhancing security requires that we start with the data – understanding the problem and identifying any gaps in existing solutions, including gaps in understanding the risks and consequences of incidents. PHMSA’s technical staff has knowledge about hazardous materials and transportation systems that can and should be brought to bear in the Federal effort to enhance security.
The joint agency working group established under the PHMSA-TSA MOU Annex is looking at ways to leverage the information that each agency possesses and collects. We are doing this in order to enhance our understanding of all risks connected with hazardous materials transportation and to bring that information to bear on an ongoing basis in all elements of our safety and security programs.
Under Executive Order 13416 and as delineated in the Annex, PHMSA and TSA are looking for ways to improve standards, recognizing that solutions need to be tailored to risks and transportation needs, both of which will change over time. Enhancing transportation security does not necessarily mean that we must impose regulatory requirements. We must be open to the range of possible solutions, driven by information about systems risks and security gaps.
Where it is appropriate to impose new standards, close coordination and consultation between the agencies – and active outreach with stakeholders – will help to ensure effective results. Better communication and outreach with affected stakeholders are important elements of the approach to enhancing transportation security reflected in the MOU Annex.
Inspection and enforcement also present opportunities for improvement. PHMSA and TSA are looking for ways to maximize the use of Federal resources by cooperating in these efforts.
Research and development are important parts of a coordinated Federal strategy. Our joint agency working group will put in place measures to ensure that we are making the best use of Federal resources by sharing research results and collaborating in the development of future projects.
Pending Improvements
Working with our DOT colleagues and TSA, we continue to consider ways to enhance the transportation security of hazardous materials. Last month, PHMSA and FRA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), proposing to revise current requirements applicable to the safe and secure transportation of hazardous materials by rail. Specifically, we are proposing to require rail carriers to compile annual data on specified shipments of hazardous materials, use the data to analyze safety and security risks along rail routes, assess alternative routing options, and make routing decisions based on those assessments.
The same notice proposes clarifications of the current security plan requirements to address enroute storage, delays in transit, delivery notification, and additional security inspection requirements for hazardous materials shipments. We have planned two meetings in early February, one here in Washington and one in Dallas, to solicit public input on the rail security proposals.
In consultation with the other DOT operating administrations and TSA, we also are taking a close look at the scope of our hazmat security plan requirements. In the three years since the requirements went into effect, we have gained experience evaluating security risks associated with specific hazardous materials and transportation environments and identifying appropriate measures to address those risks. In response to two industry petitions for rulemaking, PHMSA recently initiated a project to reconsider and refine the list of hazardous materials for which security plans are currently required. The industry petitioners asked PHMSA to amend the security plan regulations to create a distinction between hazardous materials that present a significant security risk while in transportation and the vast majority of hazardous materials that pose minimal security risks in transportation. To this end, we have initiated a rulemaking project, in cooperation with the DOT operating administrations and TSA; we published an ANPRM on September 21, 2006, and hosted a public meeting on November 30. We expect to issue a proposal by early summer of 2007.
As we refine our understanding of system risks, we’ve also taken a careful look at how we regulate access to PHMSA’s National Pipeline Mapping System (NPMS). The NPMS is a comprehensive database including geospatial and other information about all PHMSA-regulated liquid and natural gas pipelines and their relationship to populated and unusually sensitive environmental areas. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, we pulled the NPMS from the agency’s website and restricted public access out of concern that information in the system could be used in planning or targeting a terrorist attack. In the meantime, we have taken a careful look at the nature and quality of publicly available information about pipeline facilities and the safety and security implications of providing public access. We have discussed the issues with DHS and all pipeline stakeholders, safety advocates, and security experts, and we have developed an approach that we believe will minimize risk, while satisfying legitimate public right-to-know concerns.
I would like to mention that in the coming months, PHMSA will be rolling out changes to its NPMS website that will permit members of the public to access certain maps and data on a county-by-county basis. The level of detail accessible to the public will make the site useful for emergency response and local planning efforts, helping communities manage risks of development and other human activities near existing pipelines.
Our decision to restore public access to NPMS data illustrates how a data-driven, systems risk-based approach improves risk mitigation. From a systems risk perspective, public access to information is desirable, because it facilitates environmental protection, emergency response, and safety-conscious land use planning. Further, this determination may pave the way for making NPMS data available in efforts to reduce other transportation risks. As we move ahead on the rail routing rulemaking, for instance, we will consider whether access to NPMS data concerning environmentally sensitive areas may be useful in making safety and security conscious rail routing decisions.
With Congress’ support, a systems risk-based approach will be carried forward through the Hazardous Materials Cooperative Research Program, now in its first year of program management by the Transportation Research Board of the National Academies. Four initial research projects recently cleared the selection process. They are: (1) Hazmat Commodity Flow Guidance to States and Localities; (2) Enhanced Incident Data Quality for Root Cause Analysis; (3) Assessing Hazmat Emergency Response Capabilities; and (4) Emerging Technologies Applicable to Hazmat Transportation Safety and Security. PHMSA is closely monitoring the progress of that research.
Finally, like Congress, we are focused on improving the ability of States and local governments to prepare for and respond to hazardous materials incidents, whatever their cause. PHMSA is proud of its partnerships with the National Association of State Fire Marshals, the International Association of Fire Chiefs, and the International Association of Fire Fighters. Each organization has assisted in capability building across the country.
At the end of this month, PHMSA and the National Association of State Fire Marshals will co-sponsor another meeting of emergency responders, hazardous materials industry representatives, and pipeline operators. This joint effort covers a variety of initiatives intended to strengthen response capabilities and preparedness, including a recent PHMSA Advisory Bulletin on the appropriate response to ethanol spills and plans for the 2008 edition of the Emergency Response Guidebook (ERG). PHMSA publishes and distributes the ERG free of charge to the nation’s first responder community. For years, the ERG has been an important resource for first responders, providing critical guidance during the initial phase of a hazardous materials incident. For the first time, the 2008 ERG will be expanded to include a response section applicable to pipeline incidents.
CLOSING
Like Secretary Peters, PHMSA takes very seriously our responsibility to ensure the safe and secure movement of hazardous materials across our transportation system. Although we recognize that there is always room for improvement, we believe that we have a strong regulatory framework in place for hazardous materials transportation security. Together with DHS, we seek to achieve the highest level of safety and security possible, while at the same time, minimizing the burden and associated cost.
We look forward to working with the Members of this Committee, the Congress and our stakeholders as we embark on a serious and open discussion with all interested parties to further enhance the safe and secure transportation of hazardous materials.
Mr. Chairman, I commend you and the members of this Committee for your leadership on this very important topic. Thank you again for this opportunity today. I am happy to take your questions.
WRITTEN STATEMENT OF
JOSEPH H. BOARDMAN
ADMINISTRATOR
FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
BEFORE THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND
TRANSPORTATION
HEARING ON FEDERAL EFFORTS FOR RAIL AND
SURFACE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
JANURY 18, 2007
Testimony of Joseph H. Boardman,
Administrator,
Federal Railroad Administration,
U.S. Department of Transportation,
before the
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
United States Senate
January 18, 2007
Chairman Inouye, Vice-Chairman Stevens, and other members of the Committee, I am pleased to be here today to testify, on behalf of the Secretary of Transportation, about the security of our Nation's passenger and freight railroad network and the efforts that the Department of Transportation (DOT) is making to enhance rail safety and security. The Federal Railroad Administration’s (FRA) primary mission is to promote the safety of the U.S. railroad industry and to reduce the number and severity of accidents and incidents arising from railroad operations. Our railroad safety mission necessarily includes our involvement in railroad security issues. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its Transportation Security Administration (TSA) have primary responsibility for transportation security, with FRA providing support in the railroad sector. FRA works closely with TSA and the railroad industry on a daily basis in addressing railroad security and safety issues, participates in the Government Coordinating Council for Rail, and contributed its expertise to the National Strategy for Transportation Security and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan.
My testimony today will provide some background on FRA’s railroad safety program, describe the role that FRA plays in railroad security, and discuss railroad safety and security initiatives. We stand ready to work with the Committee in furthering the safety and security of our Nation’s railroad network.
Overview of the Railroad Industry
The U.S. railroad network is a vital link in the Nation’s transportation system and is critical to the economy, national defense, and public health. Passenger and freight railroads operate over 170,000 route miles of track and employ over 232,000 workers. The rail system is diverse and expansive. Security risks are inherent in its supporting infrastructure, as well as in the people and products moving through it. Most of the larger railroads have their own police force, and they are supplemented by State and local law enforcement.
Amtrak, the Alaska Railroad Corporation, and commuter railroads provide passenger rail service to more than 500 million passengers yearly. Passenger operators face many challenges in their efforts to provide a secure public transportation environment. By definition, the systems are open, providing numerous points of access and egress leading to high passenger turnover and making them difficult to monitor effectively. Amtrak, for example, operates as many as 300 trains per day serving over 500 stations in 46 States, and Amtrak trains use tracks owned by freight railroads except for operations in the Northeast Corridor and in Michigan.
Privately-owned freight railroads connect industries and businesses with each other across the country and with markets overseas, moving 42 percent of all intercity freight, measured in ton-miles, including 67 percent of the coal used by electric utilities to produce power, and chemicals used in manufacturing and water purification. Seven Class I railroads haul over 90 percent of the rail cargo in the U.S., with the remaining 10 percent being transported by 30 regional railroads and over 500 local railroads. Typically railroads move about 1.7 to 1.8 million carloads of hazardous materials (hazmat) yearly, with roughly 105,000 of these carloads being toxic inhalation hazard (TIH) materials, such as chlorine and anhydrous ammonia. Over 64 percent of TIH materials are currently transported by rail. The railroads have an outstanding record in moving all goods safely. The vast majority of hazardous materials shipped by rail every year arrive safely and without incident, and train accidents involving a release of hazardous materials that causes death are infrequent and rare, even while rail traffic volumes have increased steadily. As discussed below, DOT has an aggressive and comprehensive action plan to address the root causes of hazmat accidents, to examine and improve the integrity of rail tank cars used to transport hazmat, and to improve the railroads’ hazmat security plans. In addition, DOT’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) annually provides grant funds to States and Indian tribes to assist in the development, improvement, and implementation of hazmat emergency response plans, and to train emergency responders to respond to hazmat accidents and incidents; details on this program are contained in PHMSA’s Web site (hazmat.dot.gov).
Maintaining a safe and secure railroad transportation system is essential, and safety and security issues are being jointly addressed by the industry, DOT, and TSA.FRA’s Railroad Safety Program
FRA is the DOT agency charged with carrying out the Federal railroad safety laws. The laws provide FRA, as the Secretary’s delegate, with very broad authority over every area of railroad safety. In exercising that authority, the agency has issued and enforces a wide range of railroad safety regulations. Several of FRA’s rules have been developed with specific consideration of security concerns. For example, FRA’s January 2002 final rule barring most extraterritorial dispatching of U.S. railroad operations is based in part on the agency’s concerns about the security of foreign dispatching facilities. Similarly, FRA’s rule on passenger train emergency preparedness, discussed more fully below, requires carriers to prepare plans that deal with criminal as well as accidental events. While most of FRA’s rules are focused on the safety of railroad operations and not explicitly based on security concerns, they also necessarily have some bearing on security. For example, a railroad inspector performing an inspection required by an FRA safety regulation could potentially uncover a hazardous condition that was intentionally caused by terrorist activity. Similarly, Federal passenger and freight equipment standards are intended to ensure that the equipment can withstand forces of derailments and collisions, whether caused by accidents or deliberate acts, thereby helping to protect passengers, employees, and surrounding communities.
In addition, FRA enforces in the rail mode of transportation the Hazardous Materials Regulations, which are promulgated by PHMSA. These regulations include requirements that railroads and other transporters of hazmat, as well as shippers, have and adhere to security plans and also train their employees involved in offering, accepting, or transporting hazmat on both safety and security matters, as discussed more fully below.
To address the key safety issues facing the railroad industry, in May 2005, DOT and FRA launched an aggressive and ambitious National Rail Safety Action Plan with the following strategy:
· Target the most frequent, highest-risk causes of accidents;
· Focus FRA’s oversight and inspection resources more precisely; and
· Accelerate research efforts that have the potential to mitigate the largest risks.
FRA’s plan includes initiatives in several areas: reducing human factor-caused train accidents, the largest category of train accidents; acting to address the serious problem of fatigue among railroad operating employees; improving track safety; improving emergency preparedness and enhancing hazmat safety, including evaluating and improving the integrity of tank cars used to transport hazmat; and improving highway-rail grade crossing safety. One of the primary elements of the Action Plan is the implementation of a National Inspection Plan, which uses sophisticated trend analysis to ensure that FRA is properly allocating its inspectors so that they are directing their efforts on areas of greatest safety concern. A summary of the steps FRA has taken in implementing the Action Plan is attached to my statement.
Though the Action Plan is focused on rail safety, rail security will also be improved. In particular, enhancements to hazmat safety and emergency preparedness will result in enhancements to rail security.
FRA’s Role in Railroad Security
FRA’s involvement in railroad security predates the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. From October 1995 (when a deliberate act of vandalism caused a fatal Amtrak derailment near Hyder, Arizona) through March 2006 (when the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 was enacted), FRA helped develop and worked with Congress to secure the enactment of Federal criminal legislation to deter and punish more effectively terrorist attacks against railroads and mass transportation systems. Additionally, in 1998 FRA issued a regulation requiring passenger railroads to prepare, and secure FRA approval of, plans to address emergencies, including security threats, to train employees on the plan, and to conduct emergency simulation drills, as noted above and discussed more fully below. FRA will be exploring leveraging the National Labor College, George Meany Training Campus, to assist in providing security awareness training for railroad employees who are not receiving security training under FRA’s emergency preparedness regulation or PHMSA’s security regulation.
Since the September 11th terrorist atrocities, FRA has been actively engaged in the railroad industry’s response to the terrorist threat. The railroads have developed their own security plans, and FRA has worked with the railroads, rail labor, and law enforcement personnel to develop the Railway Alert Network, which permits timely distribution of information and intelligence on security issues. Working with DOT’s Federal Transit Administration (FTA), we have participated in security risk assessments on commuter railroads, and we have conducted security risk assessments of Amtrak as well. FRA’s security director works on a daily basis with government agencies and the railroad industry to facilitate communications on security issues, and also participates in security training, reviews security plans, and performs other activities to promote rail security. For example, FRA intends to conduct at least 15 security training sessions for rail labor organizations in 2007, as well as four sessions at the FBI Academy on railroad security and emergency response for law enforcement personnel.
In September 2004, DOT and DHS entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) concerning their respective roles on security issues. The MOU notes that DHS has primary responsibility for security in all modes of transportation but also recognizes that DOT has responsibilities in the area of transportation security. The MOU reflects the agencies’ shared commitment to a systems risk-based approach and to development of practical solutions, recognizing that each agency brings core competencies, legal authorities, resources, and expertise to the railroad mission. The MOU requires early coordination between the parties on the development of regulations affecting security. Separate annexes have been signed concerning the implementation of the Homeland Security Council’s recommendations concerning TIH materials, and concerning the coordination between FRA and TSA, FTA and TSA, and PHMSA and TSA on security matters.
The FRA-TSA annex provides for close cooperation between the two agencies on railroad security regulations, legislation, research and development, inspection activities, and response to threats to railroad security in order to maximize passenger and freight railroad security while minimizing disruptions to railroad operations to the extent practicable. The agreement provides that if an FRA inspector observes a significant security issue, the information will be provided to TSA and the railroad; similarly, if a TSA inspector observes a significant rail safety issue, the information will be provided to FRA and the railroad. FRA has one full-time employee addressing rail security matters, and all of our 71 hazmat inspectors and specialists, along with 17 State inspectors, devote a portion of their time to reviewing railroad and shipper security plans for compliance with PHMSA’s security regulations discussed below.
Freight Railroad Security
Railroads have voluntarily developed and adopted security plans based on comprehensive risk analyses, and the national intelligence community’s best practices, that address the security of not only hazmat but of freight in general. The Association of American Railroads (AAR) has established guidance for the major freight railroads in the form of a model strategic security plan. The railroad industry has also developed a detailed protocol (AAR Circular OT-55-I) on recommended railroad operating practices for transportation of high-risk hazardous materials (including TIH). FRA, PHMSA, and TSA have jointly worked with the railroad industry to build upon the railroads’ security efforts through vulnerability assessments, development of voluntary security action items, and rulemakings. Additionally, FRA has arranged a conference to permit railroads and chemical shippers to discuss routing options for the movement of TIH materials, as explained more fully below.
A special focus for FRA and DOT, collectively, is the security of hazmat transported by rail. A major initiative has been PHMSA’s March 2003 regulation requiring each shipper and carrier of significant quantities (placardable amounts) of hazmat to adopt and comply with a security plan. See 49 CFR § 172.800 et seq. Under the PHMSA regulation, security plans must include an assessment of security risks and appropriate countermeasures or mitigation strategies, or both, to address those risks. The plans must, at a minimum, address three specific areas: the security of company personnel; unauthorized access to company property; and the security of hazmat shipped or transported by the company from its origin to its destination. To assist railroads that transport hazmat and shippers that offer hazmat for transportation by rail to comply with this regulation, particularly small- and medium-sized companies, PHMSA developed a program on how to write and implement security plans for their companies.
FRA recognizes that railroad and shipper employees’ awareness and understanding of the PHMSA regulation and procedures governing the safe and secure transportation of hazmat shipments are critical. Therefore, PHMSA’s regulation provides for safety and security training for employees engaged in the transportation of hazmat. Specifically, each shipper and carrier of significant quantities of hazmat is also required to conduct two types of security training for its employees: security awareness training that provides an awareness of risks associated with hazmat transportation and methods designed to enhance hazmat transportation security, and in-depth security training concerning the company’s security plan and its implementation. These training requirements are also recurrent; employees must receive the required training at least every three years. To date, FRA personnel have reviewed more than 6,105 security plans (including plans for shippers by rail and the plans for all Class I freight railroad carriers) and conducted 4,054 inspections for compliance with the security training requirements. Moreover, FRA’s security director is currently working with the American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association to provide hazmat security training and conduct security reviews at approximately 125 short line railroads in 2007.
In April 2004, DHS and DOT took specific actions to improve the security of rail shipments of TIH materials. As part of this initiative, DHS and DOT, in cooperation with the railroads, are assessing the vulnerabilities of High Threat Urban Areas (HTUAs) through which TIH materials move by rail in significant quantity. These assessments helped result in the railroads agreeing to voluntarily implement 27 Security Action Items designed to improve the security of rail movements of TIH materials. The Action Items address system security and access control (i.e., practices affecting the security of railroads and their property), as well as en-route security (the actual movement and handling of railcars containing TIH materials), particularly in HTUAs. Full implementation of the Action Items is expected to raise the security baseline for the transportation of TIH materials. Implementation of the first 24 Action Items had begun when they were announced in June 2006, and implementation of the remaining 3 Action Items dealing with HTUAs had also been initiated when they were announced on November 21, 2006.
In August 2004, DOT and TSA published a notice and request for comments in the Federal Register asking for input on aspects of TIH rail shipments, the DOT security program requirement, and the need for additional regulation. Following review and consideration of the comments received, PHMSA, in consultation with FRA and TSA, published a notice of proposed rulemaking on December 21, 2006, to revise current requirements for the safe and secure rail transportation of hazmat. See 71 FR 76833. Likewise, TSA concurrently proposed enhancements to rail security requirements. See 71 FR 76852. Specifically, PHMSA’s proposal would require railroads to—
· compile annual data on specified hazmat rail shipments;
· use the data annually to analyze safety and security risks along rail transportation routes where those materials are transported and one possible alternative to each route;
· utilize the analyses in selecting the safest and most secure commercially practicable routes the carrier is authorized to operate over in transporting these materials;
· address the security risks associated with shipments delayed in transit or temporarily stored in transit as part of their security plans;
· notify consignees if there is a significant unplanned delay affecting the delivery of certain types of hazardous material;
· work with shippers and consignees to minimize the time a rail car containing certain types of hazardous materials is placed on track awaiting pick-up or delivery or transfer from one carrier to another;
· notify storage facilities and consignees when rail cars containing certain types of hazardous materials are delivered to a storage or consignee facility; and
· conduct security visual inspections at ground level of rail cars containing hazardous materials to inspect for signs of tampering or the introduction of an improvised explosive device (IED).
PHMSA and FRA will hold two public meetings, one on February 1, 2007, in Washington, D.C., and the second on February 9, 2007, in Dallas, Texas, to obtain oral comments on the proposed requirements.
DHS has provided funding to the Railroad Research Foundation, a nonprofit organization devoted to sustaining a safe and productive railroad industry, to develop a Web-based tool to calculate rail route specific hazmat risks, and assist in route selection decisions. This tool would be available to rail carriers in performing route analysis, and to DOT, TSA, and government emergency planners.
In late 2005, FRA granted a request by the AAR and the American Chemistry Council to convene a section 333 conference to discuss ways to minimize security and safety risks flowing from the transportation by rail of TIH materials. Section 333 of title 49 of the United States Code authorizes the FRA Administrator, as delegate of the Secretary of Transportation, to convene conferences at the request of one or more railroads to address coordination of operations and facilities of rail carriers in order to achieve a more efficient, economical, and viable rail system. Persons attending a section 333 conference are immune from antitrust liability for any discussions at the conference, and can also receive immunity for any resulting agreements that receive FRA approval. The conference has been carefully structured to minimize antitrust concerns involving the chemical manufacturers and shippers. The conference provides the railroads and chemical manufacturers and shippers with the opportunity to meet and discuss approaches to reduce the amount of TIH materials moved by rail, and to enhance the safety and security of TIH materials that are moved. FRA, PHMSA, and representatives from the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, TSA, and the Surface Transportation Board (STB) are participating in these discussions. The initial efforts of the conference are focused on chlorine and anhydrous ammonia rail transport because they represent over 80 percent of all TIH rail shipments. FRA has met with the rail carriers to discuss modeling and routing options. Further meetings with the rail carriers, as well as separate meetings with the chlorine and anhydrous ammonia shippers, are planned for early this year. In some instances, the projects agreed to at the conference may need the approval of the STB in order to be implemented.
While we must remain ever vigilant to secure hazmat shipments on our Nation’s railroads, for the sake of railroad employees and the public whom we all serve, it bears emphasizing that the vast majority of hazmat shipments arrive at their destinations safely. Considering just chlorine, for example, since 1965 (the earliest data available) there have been at least 2.2 million tank car shipments of chlorine–only 788 of which were involved in accidents (0.036 percent of all the shipments). Of those accidents, there were 11 instances of a catastrophic loss (i.e., a loss of all, or nearly all) of the chlorine lading (0.0005 percent of all the shipments). Of the 11 catastrophic losses, four resulted in fatalities (0.00018 percent of all the shipments). For all hazardous materials, in the 12 years from 1994 through 2005, hazardous materials released in railroad accidents resulted in a total of 14 fatalities. While one death is obviously too many, the record of transporting these commodities is very good, and we believe the initiatives underway will further improve upon that record.
Passenger Railroad Security
As discussed earlier, in the area of passenger railroad security, FRA requires each railroad that operates intercity or commuter passenger train service or that hosts the operation of such service to adopt and comply with a written emergency preparedness plan approved by FRA. See 49 CFR Part 239. The regulation makes clear that an “emergency” includes a security-related situation. Each plan must address employee training and qualification, and provide for both initial and recurrent training. Additionally, each railroad must establish and maintain a working relationship with emergency responders on its line by taking measures such as developing and making available a training program on the plan and inviting the emergency responders to participate in emergency simulations. The regulation requires railroads providing passenger service to periodically conduct full-scale passenger train emergency simulations (with actual equipment and simulated victims) and conduct a debriefing and critique session after actual or simulated passenger train emergency situations. FRA will continue monitoring passenger railroads for compliance with this regulation and attend each full-scale simulation and follow-up review session, such as one scheduled by the Long Island Rail Road for March with the New York City Fire Department.
In 2003, under the auspices of FRA’s Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC), FRA initiated a review of existing passenger train safety needs and programs for the purpose of developing any necessary recommendations on actions to advance the safety of passenger rail service. The RSAC is a forum for developing recommendations to FRA on rulemakings and other safety program issues, and it includes representatives from all of the rail industry’s major groups, State representatives, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), and other stakeholders. As part of this effort, the Passenger Safety Working Group was established, as well as four smaller task forces, notably the Emergency Preparedness Task Force. The Emergency Preparedness Task Force is specifically devoted to consideration of passenger train emergency preparedness issues, and includes representatives from railroads, rail labor organizations, the NTSB, FTA, and TSA. Its efforts helped lead to the issuance of proposed enhancements and additions to FRA’s regulations for passenger train emergency systems (emergency systems NPRM). See 71 FR 50276; August 24, 2006.
Emergency communication is one of the main focuses of the emergency systems NPRM. Under the proposal, all existing passenger cars would be required to be equipped with a public address system by 2012 that provides a means for a crewmember to communicate to all train passengers in an emergency situation, and all new passenger cars would be required to be equipped with an intercom system that provides a means for passengers and crewmembers to communicate with each other in an emergency situation. An intercom system could be vital in enabling a passenger to quickly alert a crewmember of a security threat, and the crewmember in turn could contact the appropriate authorities to obtain emergency assistance and use the train’s public address system to provide any necessary direction to passengers. The proposed rulemaking would also promote passenger and employee safety in an emergency situation—whether resulting from an accidental or an intentional act—by enhancing requirements for emergency window exits in passenger cars and mandating that all passenger cars, including existing cars, have rescue windows for emergency responder access. FRA is in the process of preparing the final rule, which is expected to be issued by the middle of this year. Moreover, a separate regulatory proposal is also in development within the Emergency Preparedness Task Force, focusing on passenger car emergency signage, low-location exit path marking, and emergency lighting. The proposal will be based on American Public Transportation Association (APTA) standards for passenger safety, will augment current Federal requirements, and is expected to be published by the end of 2007.
Complementing FRA’s regulations, Amtrak and commuter railroads have instituted their own security plans and conduct security training. FRA assisted Amtrak in the development of its security plan. Specifically, in coordination with Amtrak’s Inspector General, FRA contracted with the RAND Corporation to conduct a systematic review and assessment of Amtrak’s security posture, corporate strategic security planning, and programs focusing on the adequacy of preparedness for combating terrorist threats. FRA’s security director is currently working with Amtrak to implement the recommendations of the RAND study. APTA is also leading commuter railroads in the development of voluntary industry standards for passenger rail safety and security.
FRA inspectors have conducted basic security reviews of Amtrak and commuter railroad security both after the 2004 train bombings in Madrid and after the 2005 transit bombings in London. In both cases, FRA inspectors were deployed immediately after the bombings to assess the security posture of passenger railroad facilities based on a checklist of major security criteria. In the aftermath of the London bombings, FRA worked closely on these security reviews with TSA’s new rail security inspectors. TSA focused primarily on urban rapid transit lines, while FRA inspectors concentrated on commuter and intercity passenger operations; in some situations, inspectors from the two agencies worked jointly. FRA will continue to support TSA in responding to rail security threats.
In partnership with FTA, FRA also participated in security risk assessments on the ten largest commuter railroads and contributed the funding for security risk assessments on three of these railroads. In addition, FRA participated in FTA’s “best practices tool kit” initiative, contributing our knowledge of commuter rail operations, infrastructure, and organization to ensure that the recommended security enhancement measures were sound and feasible in a railroad environment. FRA staff worked closely with many of the railroads that receive FTA grant funding, to plan and assist in the development and implementation of security simulations and drills. FRA also devoted staff with both railroad knowledge and facilitation skills to the 17 FTA-sponsored workshops across the country (called “Connecting Communities”) to bring together commuter railroads, emergency responders, and State and local government leaders so that they might better coordinate their security plans and emergency response efforts.
Research and Development
FRA conducts and supports research, development, and demonstration projects related to rail safety and rail security through its Office of Research and Development, in cooperation with DHS. Both theoretical and applied research on a wide range of issues has led to impressive results and tangible technology and process improvements.
A recent example of the application of FRA’s research efforts to both rail safety and security is the Passenger Rail Vehicle Emergency Evacuation Simulator, or “Rollover Rig.” This device, which began operation in 2006, can rotate a full-sized commuter rail car up to 180 degrees to simulate passenger train derailment scenarios. The Rollover Rig is already enhancing the ability of researchers to test strategies for evacuating passenger rail cars and to evaluate the performance of emergency systems in the cars, such as emergency lighting, doors, and windows. In addition, first responders nationwide now have a unique training tool to practice effective passenger rail rescue techniques safely when a rail car is on its side. FRA developed the Rollover Rig at a cost of $450,000. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations donated the commuter rail car used by the Rollover Rig, and the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority agreed to house, operate, and maintain the simulator at its emergency response training facility located in Landover, Maryland.
We also continue to look for ways to improve tank car survivability, to reduce the likelihood that a tank car may be breached either by accident or by intentional act. PHMSA’s and FRA’s efforts to improve tank car survivability have a long and effective history. Working with the industry, all tank cars carrying hazardous materials now have top and bottom shelf couplers, and, as appropriate, tank cars are equipped with head shields, thermal protection, and skid protection for protruding bottom outlets. Tank cars carrying specific product groups, such as TIH and other particularly hazardous substances, are subject to additional requirements which became fully effective July 1, 2006, after a 10-year phase-in period.
Prior to the August 2005 enactment of Section 9005 of the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU), FRA had initiated tank car structural integrity research stemming from the circumstances of the 2002 derailment in Minot, North Dakota, involving the release of anhydrous ammonia from a tank car punctured during the derailment. Current research involves a three-step process to assess the effects of various types of train accidents (e.g., a derailment or collision) on a tank car. The first phase is development of a physics-based model to analyze the kinematics of rail cars in a derailment. The second phase is development of a valid dynamic structural analysis model; and the third phase is an assessment of the damage created by a puncture and entails the application of fracture mechanics testing and analysis methods. DOT’s Volpe National Transportation Systems Center is doing the modeling work now, and FRA will dovetail this ongoing research with the requirements of Section 9005. FRA, in conjunction with PHMSA, hopes to develop new hazardous material tank car safety standards in 2008, and we are currently consulting with railroads, shippers, and car manufacturers and have solicited pubic comments to assist us in this effort. In this connection, FRA just signed a Memorandum of Cooperation with Dow Chemical Company, Union Pacific Railroad, and the Union Tank Car Company to participate in their Next Generation Rail Tank Car Project and advance rail tank car safety.
Further, in September 2006, FRA awarded $200,000 to test sample tank car panels with various coatings to determine their ability to prevent penetration from small arms fire, as well as their ability to self-seal and, thereby, mitigate the severity of any incident. FRA developed the project in coordination with the AAR and DHS, which came up with the idea of applying to tank cars a protective coating like that used to enhance the armor protection of military vehicles in Iraq.
FRA has other research and development projects underway related to rail security which we would be happy to discuss with Committee staff.
Conclusion
FRA will continue to support TSA in carrying out its security responsibilities, and work with the rail industry to secure the Nation’s freight and passenger railroad network. Together, DOT, TSA, and the rail industry are helping to ensure that security initiatives and programs are directed at potential threats to the Nation’s railroad network and that rail employees and others responsible for its security are prepared to identify and address such threats.
Attachment
SUMMARY OF THE STEPS FRA HAS TAKEN TO IMPLEMENT ITS NATIONAL RAIL SAFETY ACTION PLAN
§ In response to various rail safety concerns, including some recent major train accidents, such as Graniteville, SC, and the lack of substantial improvement in the train accident rate in recent years, Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta launched the National Rail Safety Action Plan in May 2005. FRA has made real and substantial progress in bringing its aggressive and ambitious National Rail Safety Action Plan to fruition.
§ To reduce the number of train accidents caused by human factors (the largest category of train accidents), FRA—
* Issued a proposed Federal rule in October 2006 that would address top causes of human factor train accidents (such as failing to return a track switch to its proper position, which led to the Graniteville accident). The final rule is expected to be issued in mid-2007.
* Implemented an ongoing research program to identify human performance problems. Railroads, their employees, and FRA are entering into agreements that permit the employees to report unsafe events that do not result in a reportable accident but could have done so, without the fear of discipline.
* Made available to railroads and their employees a fatigue model that can assist them in developing crew scheduling practices based on the best current science.
* Approved the first positive train control system capable of automatically controlling train speed and movements to prevent train collisions and other accidents–the system will be installed on many BNSF Railway Company (BNSF) rail lines.
* Completed a pilot project, in partnership with BNSF, to develop a low-cost system that electronically monitors, detects, and reports a misaligned switch on mainline track located in non-signaled track territory. BNSF plans expansion of this and other similar systems on other non-signaled lines of their company.
§ To help prevent track-caused train accidents (the second-leading category), FRA—
* Developed an automated track inspection system that uses high-resolution video to detect cracks in joint bars and that can be deployed on a hi-rail vehicle to detect visible cracks in joint bars without having to stop the vehicle. Testing showed that the high-resolution video system detected visual cracks that were missed by the traditional visual inspections. The system was demonstrated to the railroads during summer and fall of 2006.
* Issued a final rule requiring track owners to develop and implement a procedure for the detailed inspection of rail joints in continuous welded rail track.
* Contracted for the construction of two automated track inspection vehicles, to be delivered in February and March, which will bring FRA’s fleet to five, allowing FRA to inspect nearly 100,000 track-miles each year, which triples the present capacity. This additional capability will permit FRA to inspect more miles of major hazardous material (hazmat) and passenger routes, while also having the ability to follow up more quickly on routes where safety performance is substandard.
§ To improve hazmat safety and emergency response capability, FRA improved emergency responders’ timely access to hazmat information. As discussed in FRA’s testimony today, FRA also accelerated its tank car structural research, hopes to issue new tank car performance standards in 2008, and has issued an NPRM on passenger train emergency systems.
§ To strengthen FRA’s rail safety inspection and enforcement program, FRA has made better use of data to direct FRA safety inspectors and other resources to where problems are likely to arise. FRA’s new National Inspection Plan was fully implemented for all FRA safety disciplines in March 2006, and further training will be provided to FRA safety personnel on how to best use the data during the scheduled national technical conferences this year.
§ To foster further improvements in highway-rail grade crossing safety, FRA—
* Built partnerships with State and local agencies by issuing, in May 2005, and extensively distributing a safety advisory describing the roles of the Federal and State governments and of the railroads in crossing safety. The advisory also reminds railroads of their responsibilities in relation to crossing accident reporting and investigation and offers assistance to local authorities in the investigation of crossing collisions where information or expertise within FRA control is required to complete the investigation.
* Aided the State of Louisiana in developing a crossing safety action plan. This State has consistently ranked among the top five with the highest number of crossing collisions and fatalities. The State approved the plan in April 2006.
* Launched an ongoing public safety inquiry into safety at private crossings.
§ We would be glad to provide the Committee with additional information on the current status of FRA’s implementation of the National Rail Safety Action Plan.
STATEMENT OF
JOHN H. HILL, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
FEDERAL MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
JANUARY 18, 2007
INTRODUCTION
Chairman Inouye, Vice-Chairman Stevens, and Senators of the Committee, thank you for inviting me today to discuss the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration’s (FMCSA) role in contributing to the security of truck and bus transportation on our highways. I am pleased to appear before you to describe FMCSA’s outreach, education, research, enforcement and compliance programs that help improve our homeland security.
Mr. Chairman, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration was created in 1999 with the mission of improving the safety of truck and buses operating on our Nation’s roads. Safety remains the primary mission of our Agency - the primary function of our regulations and our programs. FMCSA also plays a role in the security of the truck and bus industries due to our familiarity with, and oversight of these industries and the close and sometimes overlapping relationship between safety and security. The proposed legislation touches directly on one of the areas where security concerns directly impact our existing regulations – the routing of hazardous materials.
BACKGROUND
Following the tragic events of September 11, 2001, FMCSA recognized immediately the risk of terrorism associated with the transportation of hazardous materials. Within a month, the agency, with our State partners, began visiting all motor carriers that transport hazardous materials to ensure they were aware of their potential vulnerability and discuss basic security measures. We felt these measures critical as many of the companies in the trucking industry are small carriers with only a few trucks and lacking the resources to employ full-time security staff. In seven months, State and FMCSA staff conducted over 30,000 Security Sensitivity Visits on hazardous materials carriers.
FMCSA also began to take other steps to raise awareness about the security risks posed by the transportation of hazardous materials, and indeed the potential for terrorists to use the vehicles we regulate, trucks and buses, as pawns in their plans to inflict terror on our country. Despite the strictly safety mission given to the agency by the Congress, these measures were deemed justified and indeed critical, particularly before the creation of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and in the early days of that organization when they were rightly focused on aviation security.
Among the steps FMCSA took was an outreach campaign aimed at raising security awareness in the trucking industry and outreach to the law enforcement community to make them aware of the potential use of trucks, particularly those transporting hazardous materials, as weapons of terrorism. To complement these outreach efforts, we created a training course called “Trucks n’ Terrorism” to make law enforcement officials aware of indicators that should raise suspicions regarding the legitimacy of truck transportation. The agency also worked with the motorcoach industry to address security issues involving transportation of people including conducting a vulnerability assessment of the motorcoach industry and training to raise the security awareness of motor coach drivers and company officials.
Additionally, FMCSA began a significant effort to test technologies that had the potential to improve security, particularly in regard to the transportation of hazardous materials. Many of these technologies such as satellite tracking of vehicles and emergency communication devices were already in use as tools to improve safety or efficiency. FMCSA’s Hazardous Materials Field Operational Test demonstrated how these technologies could also be used to improve security and quantified the costs and benefits of these technologies. The Hazardous Materials Field Operational Test also piloted the concept of a public sector response system. FMCSA provided a copy of the report and its findings to the Department of Homeland Security in 2005. We are working with DHS on further development of this system.
FMCSA also worked with the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), now the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) to develop regulations requiring hazardous materials carriers and shippers to develop security plans and train their employees about hazardous materials security. Following implementation of this regulation, FMCSA took steps to educate both the industry and our field staff and State partners. FMCSA worked with PHMSA, various industry associations, and the now established TSA to develop a booklet to assist hazardous materials motor carriers, particularly small businesses, in developing an effective security plan. Copies of this document were distributed to every hazardous materials carrier in the FMCSA database.
To promote enforcement of the new regulation, FMCSA developed a 16-hour training course to educate our field personnel and State partners, previously focused solely on safety issues, about basic security practices. The agency also developed procedures for checking compliance with hazardous materials security regulations in what we call a Security Contact Review. To date, FMCSA has conducted over 4,000 Security Contact Reviews and assessed over 400 civil penalties for failure to comply with the hazardous materials security regulations.
In 2004, FMCSA promulgated regulations to require carriers of certain hazardous materials to obtain a hazardous materials safety permit. This program applies to carriers that transport high explosives, high route controlled quantities of radioactive materials, materials that are toxic by inhalation hazard, and large quantities of liquefied natural gas. Currently over 1,100 motor carriers have a current hazardous materials safety permit. The program is an example of an area where security overlaps FMCSA’s safety mission. In promulgating this regulation, based primarily on safety concerns expressed in the legislation requiring this program, the agency did incorporate some basic security requirements. However, it should be made clear that while we developed a regulation that has some security requirements, it was not meant to be a comprehensive security regulation and the materials the agency chose to make applicable to this requirement were based on the legislative intent and safety considerations rather than an in-depth analysis of security risk.
FMCSA’S CURRENT SECURITY ROLE
Much of the security activity I have just described occurred before, or in the early days of the TSA. For the past few years, our Agency has been working with TSA to transfer the primary security responsibility for the truck and bus industries to TSA. This is not to say that we have abandoned any role in security. As recognized in Executive Order 13416, “Strengthening Surface Transportation Security” both Departments have responsibilities in the area of transportation security.
FMCSA’s primary security activities at this point involve the transportation of hazardous materials for which Congress gave the Department specific shared responsibility in the Homeland Security Act of 2002. FMCSA continues to ensure compliance with security training and security plan regulations through our Security Contact Reviews and take enforcement action for non-compliance as warranted. We have met with TSA to coordinate these visits to motor carriers with the Corporate Security Reviews conducted by TSA personnel to ensure there is not duplication of effort or unnecessary burden placed on the industry. We have also begun work to look at including security considerations in our long-standing regulations specifying procedures for States to follow when making hazardous materials routing distinctions.
Our Agency also remains involved in consulting with DHS and TSA on various issues ranging from our joint regulations for background checks for drivers holding Commercial Driver’s Licenses with hazardous materials endorsements, implementation of the REAL ID Act, to participation on panels to make decisions about security grants for motorcoach companies.
HAZARDOUS MATERIALS ROUTING AND ROUTE PLANS
As I mentioned earlier, decisions regarding the routing of hazardous materials is one area FMCSA has identified as relating to security in addition to the safety issues that were the original impetus for the regulations. FMCSA has two sets of regulations governing the routing of hazardous materials. Standards for the routing of non-radioactive hazardous materials (NRHM) and requirements for routing of highway route-controlled quantities (HRCQ) of radioactive materials (RAM). Both parts contain sections setting out requirements States or Indian tribes must follow to establish, maintain, and enforce HM routing designations.
To establish routing designations or restrictions, a State or local government or Indian tribe must consider 13 factors such as population density, type of highway, type and quantities of HM, emergency response capabilities, exposure, terrain considerations, alternative routes, effects on commerce, delays in transportation, congestion, and accident history. FMCSA has developed guidelines for designating hazardous materials routes or preferred routes for highway route controlled radioactive materials. Currently security is not required to be a factor considered in making routing decisions and as such, security is not covered in the FMCSA guidance regarding making routing decisions. Last year, FMCSA began a study to: 1) modify existing guidance materials to State and Local governments and Indian tribes in designating routes to ensure the safe and secure transportation of HM; and 2) develop tool(s) that will assist the these entities in assessing the security vulnerabilities of current and proposed HM routes. We expect to complete the study by the fall of 2007.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, as the Nation moves to become more secure and protect our citizens from the threat posed by terrorism, it is important that we move deliberately and responsibly; to secure our transportation systems without paralyzing them. That is what FMCSA has attempted to do since the tragic events of September 11, 2001 and what we continue to endeavor to do as we support Agencies inside and outside the Department on transportation security initiatives. We look forward to working with your committee and the other agencies present at this hearing today to implement this important piece of legislation.
INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION STATUS REPORT: SS07-03 HOUSTON - New supplies arrived at the International Space Station Friday night as an unpiloted Russian cargo spacecraft docked to the Pirs Docking Compartment. With more than 2.5 tons of food, fuel and supplies for the station's Expedition 14 crew, the ISS Progress 24 automatically docked to Pirs at 8:59 p.m. CST on Friday as the station flew 220 miles above the South Atlantic off the southeast coast of Uruguay. The 24th Progress to visit the station launched Wednesday night from the Baikonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan. Unlike its predecessor, Progress 24 linked up to the station after its automated rendezvous antenna retracted as planned in the final 50 meters prior to docking. On Oct. 26 the automated navigation antenna on the Progress 23 failed to retract. Expedition 14 Commander Mike Lopez-Alegria and Flight Engineer Mikhail Tyurin will conduct a spacewalk in late February to manually retract and tie down the antenna before the older Progress undocks from the aft port of the Zvezda service module in early April. The crew will open the hatch to the new Progress overnight and deactivate the systems of the newly arrived craft before its cargo is unloaded over the next few weeks. Progress 24 holds 1,720 pounds of propellant for the Russian thrusters, 110 pounds of oxygen and almost 3,300 pounds of spare parts, experiment hardware and life support components. In addition to preparing for the cargo ship's arrival, the Expedition 14 crew worked this week on a variety of station maintenance tasks and science experiments. Lopez-Alegria and Flight Engineer Suni Williams reported what they ate and drank, and collected blood and urine samples as part of an experiment know as Nutrition. The experiment looks at how the human body processes nutrients in microgravity. Lopez-Alegria replaced limited life components in the Volatile Organic Analyzer (VOA), part of the Crew Health Care System. The VOA is a gas analysis system used to assess the levels of organic compounds in the station atmosphere, some of which could become harmful to the crew in high concentrations. The old components will be returned to Earth on the next shuttle mission. Williams focused on work with lentil seedlings as part of an experiment called Threshold Acceleration for Gravisensing, or "Gravi." The experiment uses a European Modular Cultivation System centrifuge to document the effects of varying levels of gravity on the development of plant roots with an eye toward growing edible plants for future, long-duration spaceflights. Tyruin worked with a number of Russian experiments, including an instrumented workout on a stationary bicycle to collect data on ways to limit bone and muscle density loss associated with long-duration spaceflights. All three crew members also spoke with experts on the ground planning the upcoming Expedition 14 spacewalks. Lopez-Alegria, Tyurin and Williams will begin on-board preparations for those spacewalks along with a fourth to remove the navigation antenna from Progress 23. The first three spacewalks by Lopez-Alegria and Williams are designed to continue outfitting the newly activated cooling systems for the station's truss and to continue preparations for the relocation of the P6 solar array truss structure. For more about the crew's activities and station sighting opportunities:
With flags around the nation still at half
staff in memory of the late President Gerald R. Ford, Vice President
Richard B. Cheney called today's naming of the Navy's newest aircraft
carrier in Ford's honor an even more fitting tribute because it looks to
the future.
Speaking today at the Pentagon naming ceremony for the ship, Cheney
joined Navy Secretary Donald C. Winter and other officials and
servicemembers in naming the first of the new CVN-21 class of aircraft carrier the
USS Gerald R. Ford.
The new class will replace the USS Enterprise and CVN-68 class
carriers.
When USS Gerald R. Ford enters the Navy fleet in seven or eight years,
it and its sister ships "will help ensure the sea power of the United
States for the next half century," the vice president said.
Winter described the capability the new carriers will bring to the
fleet. "This fleet of the most technologically advanced aircraft carriers
in the world will be the Navy's premier forward asset for crisis
response and principal platforms in providing early, decisive striking power
in a major combat operation," he told the audience.
The new carriers will be able to generate 25 percent more aircraft
sorties than current carriers, generate three times the electricity, and
include an improved, fully integrated warfare system and other new design
technologies, he said.
"CVN-21 is an investment in our future, and the Department of the Navy
is urgently moving forward to turn our plans into reality," Winter
said.
Cheney described the technical marvel the USS Ford will present when it
hits the high seas. "When completed, the USS Gerald R. Ford will be a
sight to behold: 100,000 tons of American ingenuity and power, riding 20
stories above water level, about as long as the Empire State Building,
and able to sail the oceans for 20 years without refueling," he said.
Winter said USS Ford and its sister carriers will send a message
wherever they sail. "A U.S. Navy aircraft carrier is a symbol recognized
around the world," he said. "It represents American power. It is a reminder
of America's global interests and global reach. It is, in the eyes of
freedom-loving people everywhere, a safeguard in a troubled and
dangerous world."
As an example, he noted the Jan. 11 announcement that President Bush
had ordered an additional carrier strike group, the USS Stennis group, to
the Middle East. "We do not expect this to be the last time the
commander in chief will be turning to Navy carriers to respond immediately to
a crisis far from our shores," Winter said.
Like Bush, Ford recognized the important capability carriers bring to
the Navy, Cheney said. "He understood that protecting the American
people required defending our interests in far-away places," he said. "He
understood that, for our forces to be credible, they must be able to
deploy wherever and whenever needed." This, he said, requires the power to
sail the world's oceans and control the water's surface, the ocean
depths and the skies overhead.
Winter called the naming of the first CVN-78 carrier after Ford a
fitting way to honor the former president's service and recognize his deep,
lifelong personal connection to aircraft carriers. "He served aboard a
carrier during (World War II)," Winter said of Ford. "As president, he
commanded carriers in the fleet. During his tenure as president, he
also commissioned USS Nimitz, the first in its class of nuclear-powered
carriers.
"No one would have appreciated more the honor of having a carrier named
after him than President Ford," Winter said.
Susan Ford Bales, the late president's daughter, thanked the U.S.
military for the tribute its members paid her father during his funeral
services and expressed the family's pride in having an aircraft carrier
named for him.
She recounted Ford's own words, when he knew Winter was considering
naming a carrier for him, as expressed in a personal letter. "It is a
source of indescribable pride and humility to know that an aircraft carrier
bearing my name may be permanently associated with the valor and
patriotism of the men and women of the United States Navy," Ford wrote
shortly before his Dec. 26 death.
Betty Ford, Ford's widow, was not at today's ceremony but watched it
from home on the Pentagon Channel, her daughter noted at the ceremony
